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HELLER v. OSBURNSEN: SLAPPING DOWN THE
FRIVOLOUS APPELLANT
David Gorman
I. INTRODUCTION
"[Clounsel must realize that the decision to appeal should be a
considered one . . not a knee-jerk reaction to every unfavorable
ruling."'
Standing alone, the 1976 Montana Supreme Court decision of
Heller v. Osburnsen' merits little more than cursory attention. The
imposition of a $1000 penalty on counsel for taking an obviously
meritless appeal seems harsh, but hardly a matter of more than
passing concern; but the imposition of costs and penalties for ap-
peals that are frivolous or solely for delay, is no longer an isolated
phenomenon. A minority of states, by statutes or rules of court,3 and
the United States Courts of Appeals are imposing such penalties at
a vastly accelerated rate. This note will discuss the circumstances
in which courts have imposed penalties for frivolous appeals, and
the likelihood of continued and expanded imposition of such penal-
ties.
II. THE PENALTY
The discretionary power of the Montana Supreme Court to
impose a penalty of the type in Heller is set forth in Rule 32, Mon-
tana Rules of Appellate Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as
Rule 32):
Damages for Appeal Without Merit. If the Supreme Court is satis-
fied from the record and the presentation of the appeal, that the
same was taken without substantial or reasonable grounds, but
apparently for reasons of delay only, such damages may be as-
sessed on determination thereof as under the circumstances are
deemed proper.
The language of Rule 32, which became effective on January 1, 1966,
1. Simon & Flynn, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 513 F.2d 832, 835 (2d Cir. 1975).
2. - Mont. -, 548 P.2d 609 (1976).
3. ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 14 (1958); ARIz. REY. STAT. § 12-2106 (1956); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 907 (West Supp. 1977); FLA. APP. R. 3.17 (1977); GA. CODE § 6-602 (1971); IND. R. APP. P.
15(F) (Bums 1973); LA. CODE PRO. ANN. § 2164 (West 1961); ME. REv. STAT. tit. 14, § 1802
(1965); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 211A, § 15 (West 1974); MICH. COMP. LAWs ANN. § 27.4445
(1962); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-3-23 (1972); Mo. S. CT. R. 84.18 (1977); NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-
1603 (1975); NEv. R. APP. P. 38 (1973); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 490:14-a (Supp. 1975); OR.
REV. STAT. § 19.160 (1975); PA. R. APP. P. 2744 (1976); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 15-30-6
(6) (1967); TEX. R. Civ. P. ANN. 438 (1967); Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 251.23(3) (West 1971).
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is identical to that of former Montana Supreme Court Rule XIX,
and is substituted for the less convoluted language of the correspon-
ding Federal Rule of Appellate Civil Procedure: "If a court of ap-
peals shall determine that an appeal is frivolous, it may award just
damages and single or double costs to the appellee." 4 Because the
Montana Supreme Court has not literally applied Rule 32, there has
been no practical difference in application between the Federal and
Montana Rules.
III. PAST AND PRESENT APPLICATIONS
A. Montana
Heller v. Osburnsen is a fairly typical case of frivolous appeal.
The case had been before the court on two previous occasions which
the court, for the purposes of its opinion, termed Heller P and Heller
11. The action arose out of the sale of ranch properties by Heller to
the Osburnsens.
Heller I involved a declaratory judgment action brought by
Heller to adjudicate the respective rights and duties as to the ranch
sale transaction. The trial court's interpretation of the contract be-
tween the parties was affirmed with directions to make a supple-
mental accounting. In Heller II, the accounting was attacked as
incorrect and violative of due process. The court summarily af-
firmed the accounting, hinting at the absurdity of the due process
argument. The court found that the Osburnsens were liable to Hel-
ler in the amount of $16,800 together with interest on the sum of
$14,600.
After some negotiation regarding another $5100 owing from the
Osburnsens to Heller under the contract, counsel for both parties
entered into a stipulation which provided that the escrow agent
would compute the annual payments due and deduct the amount
actually paid. The Osburnsens would then pay the sum of all arrear-
ages with interest from the date of the actual default. The escrow
agent declined to make the necessary computations, so the Osburn-
sens' attorney took it upon himself. He computed the amounts due
on the basis of how the escrow agent had actually applied the pay-
ments, rather than how they should have been applied pursuant to
the trial court judgment and accounting which had been upheld by
the Montana Supreme Court. Using this novel approach, the Os-
burnsens' attorney reached the conclusion that they owed Heller a
4. FED. R. App. Civ. P. 38. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1912 (1970).
5. Heller v. Osburnsen, 162 Mont. 182, 510 P.2d 13 (1973).
6. Heller v. Osburnsen, - Mont. -, 541 P.2d 1032 (1975).
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total of $152, rather than the $23,600 demanded by Heller. He then
tendered the $152 in full settlement of the action and debt. Heller's
attorney responded with several concurrent actions. First, he de-
clared the tender an insult and indicated that he considered the
stipulation void (noting that the Osburnsens' attorney had com-
puted the payments as though he had won both appeals). Second,
he gave notice of default pursuant to a clause in the ranch sale
contract. Third, he caused execution to issue on the judgment in the
amount of $23,600. The Osburnsens' attorney filed a motion to
quash the execution and warned the sheriff that he would be held
liable if he executed improperly. Undaunted, the sheriff executed
on the Osburnsens' bank account for the full amount.
After a hearing on the motion to quash, the district court denied
the motion on the grounds that the stipulation was ambiguous and
that it had not been carried out by the escrow agent according to
its terms. It was from this denial that the ill-fated appeal was taken.
The Montana Supreme Court held that the amounts due under
the contract had already been determined, and that no stipulation
could change this determination, which the court characterized as
res judicata. It went on to say that there could be no doubt as to
the propriety of a writ of execution for enforcement of a money
judgment. Turning to appellee's motion to dismiss the appeal, the
court held that this was a proper case to grant the motion and
impose a penalty on counsel for bringing an appeal that was frivo-
lous and without merit. It stated that, in its view the appeal was
nothing more than an attempt by counsel for the Osburnsens to
question the propriety of the court's previous determinations.
The Montana Supreme Court has imposed penalties under
Rule 32 in a number of cases. The most recent of the cases imposing
such a penalty is Farmer's State Bank v. Iverson.7 Appellants
(Bouma) had not properly filed to intervene in the trial court, yet
attempted to appeal the judgment to the supreme court. Appellants
also tried to introduce new evidence by means of an affidavit of
counsel. This ignorance, or effrontery, cost appellants $1000. In
Sutton v. Empire Savings & Loan Association' the appellant neg-
lected to follow the rules in the filing and perfection of his appeal.
The court dismissed the appeal on this basis, and after "viewing the
record as a whole," 9 imposed a penalty for total lack of merit.
Weinheimer v. Scott, 0 in which counsel for the Osburnsens ap-
peared, is the best illustration of the extension of the Montana
7. 162 Mont. 130, 509 P.2d 839 (1973).
8. 147 Mont. 124, 410 P.2d 456 (1966).
9. Id. at 128, 410 P.2d at 458.
10. 143 Mont. 243, 388 P.2d 790 (1964).
19771
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Supreme Court's discretion under Rule 32. Appellant had already
made one appeal on the merits, and the court termed this res judi-
cata as to the issues raised on the second appeal. This did not,
however, seem to be the crux of the court's reasoning for the imposi-
tion of the penalty. Rather, the court dwelt indignantly on counsel's
calling the attention of the court to Canons 19 and 20 of the Judicial
Canons of Ethics "as if to charge the court with violating them.""
The court excused the appellant from the penalty, commiserating
with him for having "inexperienced counsel,"' 2 and charging counsel
with the $500 payment. It does not appear from the record whether
counsel for appellee raised the issue of the Rule 32 penalty.
In several other cases the court discussed the penalty, but re-
fused to impose it. These cases fall into two general categories: (1)
those where the appellee has sought the penalty but the court has
found some merit in the issues raised by appellant, and (2) those
cases where the penalty might be warranted but the appellee failed
to raise the penalty properly, if at all.
Clearly, the court's action in those cases where the appeal had
some merit or raised a legitimate issue cannot be questioned. The
recent case of Hammill v. Young" sets out the standard for appeals
having sufficient merit to escape the imposition of a penalty:
"[Tihe issues on appeal are arguable and have not heretofore been
decided by this court."' 4 Earlier cases employed a similar test,
without mentioning the "previous decision" qualification. 5
The legitimacy of the second category is questionable, however,
as the language of Rule 32 does not seem to require the appellee to
raise the question of the penalty, nor has the court uniformly re-
quired the appellee to do so. In Gray v. Bohart,5 a penalty seemed
clearly warranted on the facts, but the court refused to impose a
penalty. The case had been before the court on two previous occa-
sions, and the court noted that those decisions rendered the issues
raised on the third appeal res judicata. The parallels to Heller v.
Osburnsen are obvious, but counsel for appellee apparently failed
to raise the issue of the frivolous nature of the appeal. In Gramm v.
Insurance Unlimited'7 the court, while expressing its concern with
11. Id. at 246, 388 P.2d at 791.
12. Id. at 247, 388 P.2d at 792.
13. - Mont. -, 540 P.2d 971 (1975).
14. Id. at -, 540 P.2d at 974.
15. Larry Larson & Assocs. v. John R. Daily, Inc., 158 Mont. 231, 490 P.2d 355 (1971);
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 150 Mont. 182, 433 P.2d 795 (1967); State ex.
rel. Valley Center Drain Dist. v. Board of County Commissioners, 105 Mont. 290, 72 P.2d 461
(1937).
16. 131 Mont. 522, 312 P.2d 529 (1957).
17. 141 Mont. 456, 378 P.2d 662 (1963).
[Vol. 38
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the legal basis of the appeal, refused to impose a penalty, based on
the fact that appellee had not raised the issue until the oral argu-
ments, and that counsel for appellant did not have sufficient notice
to meet the issue. In Whitcomb v. Helena Water Works Co.," the
court dismissed an appeal from an interlocutory order, but refused
to impose a penalty on the novel grounds that the appellee had
failed to charge or prove the frivolous nature of the appeal despite
the fact that counsel had raised the issue both in his brief and at
oral argument. Fortunately, it appears that this quirk in the require-
ments of Rule 32 no longer presents a problem, as the court has not
invoked the requirement of pleading and proof in the last twelve
years.
In conclusion, the broad guidelines for the imposition of a Rule
32 penalty which seem to emerge from the Montana cases are:
1. A Rule 32 penalty should be both briefed and argued. 9
2. The penalty is more likely to be imposed where
a) the issues raised are res judicata;2' or
b) the court is offended by the conduct of counsel for the
appellant
(1) impugning the correctness of an earlier decision on
the merits," or
(2) attempting to introduce new matter at the appel-
late level;22 or
c) the appeal is taken from a non-appealable, interlocutory
order;n or
d) the appeal was improperly filed;"4 or
e) specifications of error are groundless.2
3. A penalty will not be granted where the appeal presents argua-
ble and previously undecided questions.26
4. The failure of the appellee to raise the issue is a factor which
may work against the imposition of a penalty.Y
18. 142 Mont. 171, 382 P.2d 822 (1963).
19. Whitcomb v. Helena Water Works Co., 142 Mont. 171,382 P.2d 822 (1963); Gramm
v. Insurance Unlimited, 141 Mont. 456, 378 P.2d 662 (1963); Gray v. Bohart, 131 Mont. 522,
312 P.2d 529 (1957).
20. Heller v. Osburnsen, - Mont. __, 548 P.2d 607 (1976); Weinheimer v. Scott,
143 Mont. 243, 388 P.2d 790 (1964).
21. Weinheimer v. Scott, 143 Mont. 243, 388 P.2d 790 (1964).
22. Farmer's State Bank v. Iverson, 162 Mont. 130, 509 P.2d 839 (1973).
23. Whitcomb v. Helena Water Works Co., 142 Mont. 171, 382 P.2d 822 (1963).
24. Sutton v. Empire Savings & Loan Ass'n., 147 Mont. 124, 410 P.2d 456 (1966).
25. Benson v. Benson, 121 Mont. 439, 193 P.2d 824 (1948).
26. Hammill v. Young, - Mont. __, 540 P.2d 971 (1975).
27. Libin v. Huffine, 124 Mont. 361, 224 P.2d 144 (1950).
19771
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B. Other Jurisdictions
Since the Montana Supreme Court has not attempted to define
the outer limits of circumstances that it will consider in deciding
whether to impose a Rule 32 penalty, the decisions of other jurisdic-
tions which have imposed such penalties may be instructive, not
only in areas in which the Montana court has already imposed pen-
alties, but also in those areas where the Montana court has not yet
had the opportunity or the impetus to rule. Some of the situations
explored in these decisions will never arise in Montana courts, such
as appeals from National Labor Relations Board orders,"' desegrega-
tion orders,29 and arbitrator's awards.'"
Some areas in which other jurisdictions impose penalties for
frivolous appeals are similar to those in which penalties are imposed
in Montana. An appeal from a non-final order is held in general
disrepute, and has even been the occasion of penalties in the United
States Supreme Court,3 ' as well as in the state courts of Washing-
ton. 32 Res judicata is another area where penalties are generally
imposed, decisions to this effect having recently been made in the
First 33 and Fifth34 Circuits, and in California. The California case,
Howarth v. Howarth,35 is something of a landmark in this area. The
case was heard twice in both the California Supreme Court and
United States Supreme Court, when the intermediate appellate
court decided that enough time had been wasted and slapped the
appellant with a statutory penalty. Counsel was undaunted, how-
ever, and appealed the penalty to both Supreme Courts as well. The
penalty stuck, and the case was not heard of again. Improper filing
has received attention in other courts, notably in Nevada 3 and
Texas.37 In the Texas case, the court refused to impose a penalty,
saying that ineptness of counsel, standing alone, did not justify the
imposition of the penalty, despite the fact that the case had been
before the court on two previous occasions and that the appellant
28. Collected in NLRB v. Lucy Ellen Candy Div. of F & F Lab., Inc., 517 F.2d 551 (7th
Cir. 1975).
29. Eaton v. New Hanover Bd. of Educ., 459 F.2d 684 (4th Cir. 1972); Northcross v.
Board of Educ. of Memphis City Schools, 489 F.2d 19 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 962
(1974).
30. Davis v. Calaway, 48 Cal. App.3d 309, 121 Cal. Rptr. 570 (1975).
31. Slaker v. O'Conner, 278 U.S. 188 (1929).
32. Arlt v. Arlt, 3 Wash.2d 462, 101 P.2d 336 (1940).
33. Local 2, Int'l. Bhd. of Tel. Workers v. International Bhd. of Tel. Workers, 416 F.2d
414 (1st Cir. 1969).
34. Monroe Auto Equip. Co., Hartwell Div. v. NLRB, 511 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1975).
35. 146 Cal. App.2d 694, 304 P.2d 147, cert. denied, 354 U.S. 926 (1957).
36. Varnum v. Grady, - Nev. ., 528 P.2d 1027 (1974).
37. International Security Life Ins. Co. v. Robichau, 510 S.W.2d 132 (Tex. Civ. App.
1974).
[Vol. 38
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insurer had a notable track record for similar inept appeals.
Several areas potentially present opportunities for imposition
of penalties by the Montana court in the future. Assertion of error
as to matters to which the appellant had stipulated in the trial
court, has resulted in the imposition of penalties in California 3 and
New Mexico." An Indiana court has imposed a penalty where the
appellant attacked jury instructions at the appellate level to which
he had not properly objected at trial." Another likely area for future
development is in the case of improper or punitive joinder of a party
to an appeal. The leading case is Compass Realty & Investment
Corp. v. A A Refrigeration & Heat. Inc.," in which the Arizona court
imposed the statutory maximum penalty on an appellant who
joined a party in an appeal in which appellant asserted no issues
that related to the appellee.
More frequent than these clearly justified penalties are those in
which the appellate courts state generally that the appeal has no
legal basis. These usually arise where the law has become "so clear
and well established that persistence in a course could be determi-
native of bad faith."4 Many of the appeals dismissed and penalized
on this ground are second or third tries by the appellant, or cases
where "calculated delay and a thrashing about . . . for theories -
even of dubious or no value . . . ,,13 is evident. The dictum in
Gramm v. Insurance Unlimited," noting the court's concern with
the appellant's legal theory, indicates that the Montana Supreme
Court would be willing to act in this type of situation. Several
United States courts of appeals45 and the Oregon court" have based
penalties on these grounds within the last seven years.
What emerges from the collection of frivolous appeal cases from
other jurisdictions is that courts in general, and especially the
United States Courts of Appeals, have imposed penalties in a some-
what broader range of circumstances than has Montana's court. The
38. Lawler v. Bannerman, 8 Cal. App.3d 893, 87 Cal. Rptr. 757 (1970).
39. Anderson v. Jenkins Constr. Co., 83 N.M. 47, 487 P.2d 1352 (1971).
40. Bradford Homes, Inc. v. Long, 221 Ind. 309, 47 N.E.2d 609 (1943).
41. 21 Ariz. App. 214, 517 P.2d 1107 (1974).
42. NLRB v. Lucy Ellen Candy Div. of F & F Lab., Inc., 517 F.2d 551 (7th Cir. 1975).
43. Oscar Gruss & Son v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 422 F.2d 1278 (2d Cir. 1970).
44. 141 Mont. 456, 378 P.2d 662 (1963).
45. First Nat'l. Ins. Co. of America v. Lynn, 525 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1975); Fluoro Elec.
Corp. v. Bradford Assocs., 489 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1973); Oscar Gruss & Son v. Lumbermens
Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 422 F.2d 1278 (2d Cir. 1970); Clarion Corp. v. American Home Products
Corp., 494 F.2d 860 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1027 (1974); Furbee v. Vintage Press,
Inc., 464 F.2d 835 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v. Certain Land in Squares 532 and 570,
473 F.2d 94 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
46. Stirling v. Dari-Delite, Inc., 262 Ore. 359, 494 P.2d 252 (1972).
19771
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areas where penalties under Rule 32 may be imposed in the future
are:
1. Improper joinder of a party in an appeal, 7
2. Appeals from matters stipulated to in trial court,"9
3. Appeals where foundation in the record has not been properly
laid, 9 and
4. Appeals having no legal basis. 0
IV. WHY THE FRIVOLOUS APPEAL PENALTY Is HERE TO STAY-AND
FLOURISH
As late as 1957, courts were still noting "[wie are thoroughly
familiar with the holdings that appellate courts are reluctant to hold
that an appeal is frivolous,"'" but, with few exceptions,52 appellate
courts in the cases arising since then have turned their collective
backs on such traditional holdings. Such indications may even be
found in Montana decisions, for the court, as noted above, has not
refused imposition of a penalty on the grounds of lack of pleading
or proof for more than a dozen years.
It is no secret that judicial hearts are warming to the imposition
of a penalty for a frivolous appeal. The key to this trend is time.
There is a wealth of judicial language in the cases cited above which
buttresses this conclusion. As Chief Judge Bazelon of the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals has written: "Appellate courts are
burdened by a heavy volume of business and the problem is need-
lessly aggravated when frivolous appeals are taken." 5 Judges in less
temperate moods have characterized frivolous appeals as being "a
shameful waste of judicial manpower."54 The number of cases on
appellate court dockets has increased dramatically in the last de-
cade and a half, and the frequency of penalties for frivolous appeals
has grown accordingly. The emphasis of this note on cases arising
in the 1970's is to be expected-most of the cases involving penalties
for frivolous appeals have arisen in these few years. As a relatively
47. Compass Realty & Inv. Corp. v. A A Refrigeration & Heat, Inc., 21 Ariz. App. 214,
517 P.2d 1107 (1974).
48. Lawler v. Bannerman, 8 Cal. App.3d 893, 87 Cal. Rptr.757 (1970); Anderson v.
Jenkins Constr. Co., 83 N.M. 47, 487 P.2d 1352 (1971).
49. Bradford Homes, Inc. v. Long, 221 Ind. 309, 47 N.E.2d 609 (1943).
50. Stirling v. Dari-Delite, Inc., 262 Ore. 359, 494 P.2d 252 (1972); Furbee v. Vintage
Press, Inc., 464 F.2d 835 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (collecting cases).
51. Howarth v. Howarth, 146 Cal. App.2d 694, 304 P.2d 147, 149, cert. denied, 354 U.S.
926 (1957).
52. International Security Life Ins. Co. v. Robichau, 510 S.W.2d 132 (Tex. Civ. App.
1974).
53. Furbee v. Vintage Press, Inc., 464 F.2d 835 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
54. Clarion Corp. v. American Home Products Corp., 494 F.2d 860 (7th Cir. 1974).
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small state in terms of population and litigation, Montana is just
now beginning to feel the pressure of an overburdened appellate
docket. As early as the mid-1960's, the California appellate courts
were beginning to penalize frivolous appeals on a regular basis."
With no decrease in the growth of appellate case load in sight,
and barring unexpected judicial reform, the Montana bar should
expect to see the flag of frivolous appeal waved with growing fre-
quency. As the demands on the court's time increase, its tolerance
for waste of that time will diminish correspondingly. In such a cli-
mate, the court would not be likely to hesitate to impose penalties
on grounds pioneered by other jurisdictions.
Obviously, the best solution to the problem lies with counsel
unsuccessful in the trial court. Appeal should not be a reaction, but
a carefully considered tactic, with all the possible gains and losses,
including the penalties discussed here, carefully weighed. For those
cases where counsel for the appellant persists, it would behoove
counsel for the appellee, in the aid of the court and his client, to
raise in his brief the issue of frivolity. There may be substantial
rewards.
55. See Kamine, Frivolous Appeals, 47 J. ST. Bi CAL. 307 (1972).
1977]
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